The most important governance question in a mutual credit system is to manage risk on behalf of all the members by determining the extent to which accounts can deviate from zero. Within a scarcity worldview, it is much more important to manage the negative limit both because members fear losing out and because there is more incentive to take without giving.
Since the credit is mutually guaranteed by all member groups and by extension, all members of all member groups, it is critical that at least this part of the governing process be participative. The same principle applies in the legal tender economy, but there is no acknowledgement that it is workers who give value to money and risk management is done by banks only to maximise their profits and losses.
Also credit must be allocated as far as possible on a case-by-case basis. Banks are increasingly automating loan applications using algorithms, and while this is good for profits it does not serve entrepreneurs. The way to process credit applications more quickly is not through automation, but through the kind of aggregation we see in microcredit, where a loan request must be guaranteed by several people. In the credit commons a whole community would apply for credit from the collective of communities, and that community would guarantee that credit.
The governing process has other responsibilities, as in any community money system: managing relations and especially disputes between communities, monitoring communities who may be struggling with their balance of trade; recruiting new members, managing public perception.
Governance could be done by volunteers, or compensated volunteers. Any tax and any ‘wages’ could only be denominated in credit for goods and services.
There might be a centralised brokering service to stimulate trade, and that brokering might be paid for with taxes or transaction fees. Alternatively brokering could be done by private individuals who could earn commission, in credit.